Title : Of the Vices Behind Biases – A Virtue Epistemology Perspective on the Contribution of Nudges as Policy Tools
Author(s) : Daniel F. Zarama Rojas
Abstract : The role of nudges is not clear in recent behavioral economics literature, while reviews call for scrutiny into the theoretical foundations from which they stem. This essay answers to that call by conceptualizing biases as part of epistemic vices and analyzing the extent to which nudges may be an adequate tool to address them. I propose a new conceptual framework for biases: virtue epistemology (VE). VE allows to associate biases with identifiable individual traits called epistemic vices, which negatively affect an individual’s capacity to judge. In this document, I discuss how a VE framework may be used for the study of cognitive biases and its possible repercussions for behavioral public policy. I advance that the different ways in which epistemic vices could lead to cognitive biases suggest that nudges are better suited to suppress the harm associated with one type of vice (obstructivist) than those brought by another (reliabilist).
Key-words : nudges, biases, virtue epistemology, epistemic vices, public policy
JEL Classification : B40, D91, D62
